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NATURE OF THE CASE AND
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This is an appeal of a criminal conviction, distribution of
a controlled substance (marijuana), following a jury trial.

The

defendant/appellant was fined and placed on probation on the condit1on that he serve thirty days in jail, a portion of which was
stayed by this Honorable Court pending this appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a

of the verdict and judgment with

a remand for a new trial with appropriate jury instruction.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant was charged with selling an ounce of marijuana
to Agent Spann of the State Drug and Liquor Enforcement Agency.
The sole defense raised by the defendant was that he was entrapped
into committing the offense.
The inducement for the sale began a week or two before the
day of the sale.

Agent Spann and two other Drug and Liquor En-

forcement Agents became acquainted with the defendant's roommate,
Mike P1ll1ng, at the Comic Book Lounge in Helper.
tf,e

Pilling invited

agents to a keg party at his and the defendant's home follow-

1ng the close of the tavern.

( T-55.)

The day of the party, Todd Evanoff had picked the defendant
''P anrl taken him to breakfast because the defendant was depressed

about being laid off from his employment.

( T-106.)

Evanoff drank

and played pool with the defendant until he had to leave for his
shift at the mine.

(T-106.)

When Evanoff returned, after work,

the defendant was still at the bar drinking and was so intoxicated
that Evanoff felt he should take him home where they found the
keg party in progress.

(T. 107.)

The agents testified that there were over thirty people at
the party but they did not notice anyone smoking marijuana nor
could they find anyone who could sell them any.

(T-58,59.)

Agent Spann closely resembled the defendant in appearance
and was introduced to people at the party as the defendant's
brother.

(T-57.)

They began acting as if they were old friends.

(T-102.)

Photographs of the defendant and Agent Spann embracing

each other at the party were introduced into evidence.

(Exhibit

D-2.)

The agents were claiming to be working as "tool runners"
visiting the drilling rigs in the Roosevelt oil fields.

(T-59.)

Agent Spann admitted that the defendant asked him if he could get
him a job (T-60), but denied that he offered to do so.

(Id.)

Mike Pilling testified that Agent Spann told the defendant
that there were a lot of jobs over in the oil fields; that he knew
a lot of people there; and that he could probably get the defendant a job.

(T-97.)

The defendant testified that Agent Spann

told him there was plenty of work in the oil fields;

that he wou11

keep an eye open for a position; and come back to Price and tell
-2-

(T-114.)

h1m when he found one.

It was in that context, accord-

1ng to the defendant, that he agreed, in return, to obtain some
marijuana for· the agent.

(T-114.)

The defendant testified that Agent Spann came back the next
morning but the defendant was too hung-over to do anything.
(T-115.)

The agent returned in four or five days and

asked the

defendant if he had found any marijuana but defendant had not.
The agent told defendant that he was going to Roosevelt and would
look for a job for the defendant (T-117) and asked the defendant
to look for some marijuana for him which the defendant agreed to
do.

(T-115,117.)
The defendant obtained some marijuana from a friend and a

scale to weigh it because he did not know how much Spann wanted.
(T-117.)

When Agent Spann returned the day of the sale, the defen-

dant invited him and two other agents in to smoke some marijuana.
The defendant asked Agent Spann how much he wanted and the agent
replied, "One ounce."

The defendant attempted to weigh out one

ounce (28 grams) but was so inept at the use of the scales that he
actually gave the agent 1.43 ounces (40 grams).

( T-52, 118, 144.)

The defendant testified that he had never sold marijuana before.
Over the defendant's objection and exception (T-142), the
trial court,

in defining "entrapment" added to the statutory

language the following paragraph:
In assessing police conduct under
the defense of entrapment, the test

-3-

to determine an unlawf11l entrcipment
is whether a law enforcement off1c1al
or agent, in order to obtci1n evidence
of the comm1ss1on of an offense, lnduced
the defendant to comnnt such an offense
by persuasion or inducement which would
be effective to presuade [sic) an average
person, other than one who was merely
given the opportunity to commit the
offense.
(Instruction c.)
The prosecutor relied heavily upon this part of the instruction in his closing and rebuttal arguments, arguing that there was
no entrapment under even the defendant's version of the facts
since an "average person" would not sell drugs because someone
promised to help him find a job.

The prosecutor asked the jurors

as "average persons" whether they would sell drugs under such circumstances.

(T-146,147.)

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY BY SUBSTANTIALLY RAISING THE
STANDARD FOR UNLAWFUL ENTRAPMENT ABOVE
THAT DEFINED BY STATUTE AND THIS COURT.
The affirmative defense of entrapment has been codified by
the legislature as follows:
§76-2-303.
Entrapment--(1)
It is a
defense that the actor was entrapped into
conirnitting the offense.
Entrapment
occurs when a law enforcement off1cer or
person directed by or acting in co-operation
with the officer induces the commission
of an offense in order to obtain ev1dence
of the commission for prosecution by methods
creating a substantial risk "that the
offense would be committed bv one not
otherwise ready to commit lt.
Conduct
merely affording a person an opportunity
to commit an offense doPs not constitute
entrapment.
- 4 -

Th1s Court has approved giving the statutory definition of
rntrapment to the iury, State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah
197

)

.

The defendant requested that the jury be so instructed in

this case.

However, the trial court, in addition to reciting the

statutory definition added the following paragraph:
In asessing the police conduct under
the defense of entrapment, the test to
determine an unlawful entrapment is
whether a law enforcement official or an
agent, in order to obtain evidence of the
commission of an offense, induced the
Defendant to commit such offense by
persuasion or inducement which would be
effective to presuade [sic] an average
person, other than one who was merely
given the opportunity to commit the
offense.
[Emphasis added.)
This paragraph did not merely clarify the statutory definition--it modified the test in two particulars.
First, the statutory definition merely requires a "substantial risk" while the trial court's test requires that the conduct
"would be effective" to induce the commission of the offense.
Second, and more importantly, the trial court's definition
requires that the conduct would induce an "average person" to comm1t the offense, while the statutory definition merely requires
conduct that might induce "one not otherwise ready to commit it."
Thus, under the statutory definition, it would be a defense if
the police engaged in conduct which created a substantial risk
U1at one who otherwise was not ready to commit the offense but did
11ot possess the moral fiber and inhibitions of the average citizen
,,,uu!d comm1t Jt; whereas, under the court's definition, it would

-5-

not be a defense if a jury believed the conduct would not have
been "effective to induce the average person".
It is difficult to imagine the type of inducement that
be effective to induce the "average" Utah c1t1zen to engage in
drug dealing.

The "average" Utah citizen regards drug dealing

as not only unlawful but highly immoral and drug dealers as reprehensible people--that is why they elect legislators who will be
tough on drug dealers.

There are, however, thousands of drug

users who do not believe that drugs are that immoral and who regard dealers as people who fulfill a need or demand.

Such a per-

son might be reluctant to sell drugs because it is a felony, but
would certainly be easier to persuade to do so than the "average"
citizen.

The legislature has decided, for policy reasons, to al-

low even weak, immoral persons to raise the defense if the inducement raised a substantial risk that one otherwise not ready to
commit the offense would commit it.
In the hands of a competent prosecutor, the trial court's
definition practically eliminates the defense of entrapment because the defense must persuade a jury of "average citizens" that
the police conduct shown by the evidence would have been effective
to induce them to deal drugs--not an easy thing to do.

Carbon

County juries have a reputation for disl1k1ng the methods of the
State Liquor and Narcotics Enforcement Officers but they are cer
tainly not going to say that drug dealing 1s something the aver.•g
person can be induced to do.

The trial court believed that this Court had mandated giving
an "average person" instruction in State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366
(Utah 197

)

<

(T-144.)

As noted earlier, State v. Salmon upheld

a conviction where the statutory definition had been given to the
iury, 612 P.2d at 369.

The Salmon decision does, however, in the

course of analysis, state:
As stated in Taylor, the objective
test does not prohibit the police from
affording a person an opportunity
to commit crime, it only prohibits
active inducements on the part of the
government for the purpose of luring
an "average" person into the commission
of an offense.
612 P.2d at 368.
However, the author of that decision did not suggest that
that sentence be taken out of context and delivered to a jury as
the test.

The "average person" language originated in State v.

Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 503 (197

) and, unfortunately, was reduced

to a headnote in Utah Code Annotated, §8b U.C.A.

3 (1982 Supp.).

However, the clear dictum nature of the language is made evident
by reading the case.

In Taylor, this Court reversed a jury

verdict and held that there was entrapment, as a matter of law,
because the police used a former girlfriend who induced the defendant to get heroin because she was going through withdrawal.
Surely th1s Court was not saying that a Jury must find that such
inducment would be effective to persuade the "average person" to
sE"ll heroin.

The "average person" might feel sorry for a drug

'"id1ct and find treatment for him, but certainly would not go get
l1ero1n and sell it to him even if the addict was a former lover.

The one sentence headnote, taken alone, is

actually in direct

conflict with the holding of the case.
The instant case illustrates the danger of taking a single
sentence out of a complex analysis of a rather esoteric legal
point and incorporating it into a jury instruction.

The statutory

definition clearly states the test and neither Salmon nor Taylor
modified the statutory test.

The Salmon decision approved giving

the statutory definition, 612 P.2d at 369, and the Taylor decision
clearly did not apply an abstract "average person" test yet alone
mandate that a jury be given an instruction requiring the application of such a test.
The trial court believed the issue to be a choice between
the "subjective" and "objective" tests and that this Court had
adopted the objective test.

(T-144.)

It is doubtful that the fine

distinctions drawn by appellate courts in the course of "subjective" versus "objective" debates are particularly germane to
the fact situation with which this jury was presented, and whether
a jury would understand them in any event.

The objective/sub-

jective distinction is important primarily where there is evidence
of predisposition on the part of a defendant, such as prior
criminal acts.

The objective test precludes such evidence unless

the defendant "opens it up" himself.
P.2d 164 (Utah

9.. , State v. Hansen, 588

Here the defendant put his character in

issue with evidence of no prior sales.
It is submitted that even the most ardent advocate of the
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"objective test" would not instruct a jury with the language used
in the instant case.

One can apply the statutory test objectively

by testing whether the police conduct might induce the commission
of the offense by one not otherwise ready to commit it and who was
not merely given an opportunity to commit the offense.

The por-

tion of the trial court's instruction which the appellant objects
to did not concern the manner in which the test was to be applied
but stated what the test itself was.

The statutory test, guarded

against police conduct which would create criminals rather than
discover them.

Certainly, that half of the population which is

below average is the most vulnerable to such conduct and should
not be deprived of the defense.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that this Court correct the misinterpretation of the dicta from Taylor and Salmon and order a new
trial for defendant with a jury instruction comporting with the
statutory test for unlawful entrapment.
DATED this 21st day of December, 1983.

ttorney for Defendant/Appellant
44 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5835
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CERTIFitATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

day of December, 1983, I

delivered a true copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the
attorney for the plaintiff/respondent herein, Attorney General,
State of Utah, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
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